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Abstract: Decisions about location choice provide an opportunity to compare the predictions of 
optimization models, which require exhaustive search through very large choice sets, against the 
actual decision processes used by entrepreneurs choosing where to allocate investment capital.  
This paper presents new data on entrepreneurs’ self-described decision processes when 
choosing where to locate, based on scripted interviews with 49 well-placed business owners and 
senior managers in charge of location choice.  Consideration sets are surprisingly small, 
especially among those who are successful.  According to entrepreneurs’ own accounts, 
locations are frequently discovered by chance rather than systematic search.  Few describe 
decision processes that bear any resemblance to equating marginal benefit with marginal cost as 
prescribed by standard optimization theory.  Nearly all interviewees describe location choice 
decisions based on threshold conditions, providing direct evidence of satisficing rather than 
optimization.  Imitation is beneficial for small investment projects.  Decision process data 
collected here suggests a need to rethink standard policy tools used to stimulate local economic 
development. 
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Success From Satisficing and Imitation: Entrepreneurs’ Location Choice and Implications 
of Heuristics for Local Economic Development 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
Economic models of business decision making in both neoclassical and behavioral 
economics are typically based on the assumption of constrained optimization: a process that 
requires exhaustive search through all elements in the relevant choice set, assigning net benefit 
scores (i.e., benefits minus costs) to each element in this choice set, and finally choosing the 
element with the highest net benefit score.  In contrast, this paper takes an empirical approach to 
describing the process by which business owners make high stakes decisions about where to 
locate their businesses, or branches of their businesses.  Rather than assuming that location 
choice results from a process of optimization, this paper uses a scripted in-depth interview of 49 
entrepreneurs (i.e., business owners or senior managers with personal capital at risk when 
making location choice decisions) in the Dallas-Forth-Worth greater metropolitan area.
2  The 
interview script probes the size of business owners’ consideration sets, the criteria they use to 
stop searching, and the criteria used to select an element from their consideration or choice sets.   
Economists often argue that the very essence of economics is precisely the axiomatic 
(i.e., without evidence to check its validity) assumption of optimization.  Looking at the world 
under the presumption that all observed behavior derives from a process of constrained 
                                                           
2 In contrast with surveys, interviews are a non-standard data source within economics (Yonay, 2000; Yonay and 
Breslau, 2006).  Nevertheless, a number of important interview studies have appeared in the economics and business 
economics literature (Schwartz, 1987; Bewley, 1999; Schwartz, 2004; Wennberg and Nykvist, 2007). These papers 
use interview data as source material for developing new economic theories as well as for testing established theory. 3 
 
optimization introduces strong restrictions about what can be inferred from empirical 
observations and influences prescriptive advice for public policy makers.  In particular, if one 
observes a section of a city that, for years, does not attract business investment, the assumption 
of universal optimization implies that this must reflect a lack of profitability (i.e., better 
opportunities were to be found elsewhere).  If no one is investing there, then the logic of 
optimization says that it must not be profitable to do so.  This paper shows this logic to be 
invalid.  
Even when so-called behavioral models are introduced, the methodology typically adds 
parameters (e.g., representing biases, decision costs, or random noise) to otherwise standard 
constrained optimization models, rather than testing or substantively modifying the axiomatic 
assumption of constrained optimization (i.e., that observed decisions arise as the result of 
exhaustively searching for the best feasible alternative).  In addition to descriptive work based on 
the axiomatic assumption of as-if constrained optimization, prescriptive advice about how 
business decisions ought to be made frequently reflect the standard methodological tenets as the 
gold standard of rationality, from which adages such as “Consider all the alternatives,” “Look 
before you leap,” or “Be sure to consider all the trade-offs,” follow.  This paper demonstrates 
that, among successful entrepreneurs, more choice and more information do not guarantee 
superior performance. 
The interview data presented in this paper indicate three main findings.  First, the 
consideration sets for the high stakes decision of where to locate the business are extremely 
small—radically smaller than is predicted by the theory of constrained optimization.
3  Second, 
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costs against the benefits of further search. This is a potentially important explanation counter to the one presented 4 
 
rather than beginning with large-sale search to constitute the consideration set with a range of 
alternatives, a surprisingly large number of locations are discovered by random chance while on 
unrelated business or leisure activities.  Third, the criteria used by business owners to finalize 
decisions and choose a single element out of the many possibilities are nearly always stated as 
inequalities, which I interpret as evidence of satisficing heuristics.   
Landlords who invest in mall properties talk about requiring an 80 percent occupancy 
rate within a year.  Gas station and convenience store investors talk about requiring at least 10 
percent annual return on capital within one or two years.  Nearly all business owners state the 
decisive factor in their location choice as an inequality: “If I can get at least x return within y 
years, then I’ll do it.”   
The standard economic model stated in terms of calculus requires that marginal benefit 
equal marginal cost (as a necessary but not sufficient condition) for any optimal choice.  No one 
in our interview data mentioned such a condition or required any exact equating of two 
quantities.  Rather threshold, or satisficing, decision procedures characterized their reasoning. 
One could of course include search costs, time costs, information costs, etc., to add 
“realism” to the model.  A handful of entrepreneurs interviewed described the reason for 
terminating search after considering just a handful of locations with phrases such as, “Looking at 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in this paper and is frequently raised in the neoclassical and behavioral economics literature.  I deal with this in 
several places below and present evidence that speaks against this interpretation.  Two simple observations from the 
interview data can be mentioned here.   First, none of the entrepreneurs (who spoke with economic sophistication 
about some quantitative measures such as rates of annual return) mentioned quantifying the expected benefit of 
further search or produced any measures of the costs of time, information or deliberation.  Second, none discussed 
exhaustively scanning the space of possible search lengths that is required to choose a stop-search condition under 
optimization.   5 
 
any more properties wouldn’t have been worth it.”  Yet none of the interviewees described a 
process of quantifying expected benefits of continued search or the costs of time, information 
and deliberation.  A paradox of search models that  introduce costs of search is that, by hanging 
onto the assumption of optimization, they require decision makers to consider every possible 
length of search and compute a stopping rule optimally after considering all the possible search 
lengths, which paradoxically does not save time or deliberation costs at all.  Instead, every 
entrepreneur mentioned at least one threshold, or inequality condition, indicating to him or her 
that it was all right (i.e., good enough, but not necessarily optimal) to go ahead and make a final 
decision, even though the consideration set remained very small.   
A typical story is this.  One of Dallas’ most prominent commercial high-rise and 
residential real estate developers described bumping into a large, undeveloped tract of land while 
driving to play golf in a northern suburb: “The idea struck me as I was driving by that area, that 
it could be developed into a property of note.  I told my [spouse] to drive by to get a feel for the 
area.  We liked it.  It felt right.  Then I ran the numbers and it looked like we could get at least 20 
percent annual return on capital within two or three years.  That was enough to make it 
worthwhile to go ahead.” 
Note what is ruled out by this description.  There is no exhaustive search through 
thousands of potential locations and alternative uses of the investment capital to ensure the 
highest possible return.  By the business owner’s account, a threshold condition had to be met.  
And once it was met, that by itself terminated the search phase and finalized the decision to 
invest.   
More stark contrasts emerge between the satisficing decision processes described in 
interviews with business owners and the standard model’s assumption of constrained 6 
 
optimization.  These additional findings include two less-is-more effects.  Business owners 
making location choice decisions typically focus on one, two or three pieces of information.  
Those who avoided too many types of information and used the information they did collect in 
order to satisfy a satisficing condition had a greater chance of meeting or exceeding the return 
they expected at the time of investment.  In other words, less information and not attempting to 
optimize appear to raise the chances of success, at least for the business owners in this sample.  
Finally, an information-frugal event-tree model of performance (i.e., falling below, meeting, or 
exceeding expectations) achieves a surprisingly high rate of accuracy—more than 90 percent—in 
contrast with maximum-likelihood estimates based on more information, which never reach 
accuracy rates of higher than 60 percent. 
There is a debate within behavioral economics concerning how to interpret such 
findings.
4  When the predictions of standard theory do not match what is observed in the real 
world, one interpretation is that the people are making mistakes.  Some go as far as suggesting 
that the standard rational choice model enjoys such compelling normative authority that 
educators, business schools and legislatures should seek to “de-bias” people who fail to conform, 
                                                           
4 A fuller account of the normative debate taking place within behavioral economics is in Berg (2003, 2010) and 
Berg and Gigerenzer (2010).  In contrast to Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler’s interpretation of violations of the standard 
theory as pathological, several papers document that markets with biased beliefs (Berg and Lien, 2005) or 
nonstandard behavioral procedures (Berg and Gigerenzer, 2007) can outperform economies populated by agents 
who conform to the standard normative theory.  And at the individual level, Berg, Biele and Gigerenzer (2010) and 
Berg, Eckel and Johnson (2010) present evidence of improved performance among individuals who violate axioms 
of internal consistency upon which the optimization models are based.  This raises the issue of what it means to 
make a good decision and whether standard rationality axioms provide a useful basis for prescribing how people 
ought to make decisions, which is discussed further below.   7 
 
modifying   behavior to be more in accordance with theories of optimal choice and axiomatic 
rationality (Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 1998).   
A very different logical deduction, based on the same observed tension between the 
standard normative model and observed behavior, is to modify shortcomings in the theory and 
collecting new data to better explain the decision procedures in use and the environments in 
which they perform well.  By describing the reward structure of environments and the decision 
processes that match well (or badly), empirically grounded rather than axiomatic normative 
assessments can be made based on the principle of ecological rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten, 
2001; Smith, 2003; Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010).  
Because the agents in this study who use allegedly anomalous decision procedures are 
very successful by the metric of accumulated wealth, this provides a special opportunity to 
strengthen the empirical record documenting the decision processes used by entrepreneurs. 
Whatever those processes turn out to be, it behooves students of business, psychology, and 
economics alike, to be open to learning how those with a robust record of operating a going 
concern in the real world cope with challenges and take new risks.  Rather than documenting yet 
another deviation from axiomatic rationality and interpreting it as a human foible or systematic 
limitation in human capacity, this paper seeks to describe in detail what it is that successful 
business owners do when choosing where to locate their businesses.   Whether giving 
prescriptive advice to loved ones or advising MBA students, I argue that we have a lot to learn 
from the self-described decision processes of entrepreneurs.  When content-blind (i.e., context-
free, universal, or domain-general) normative axioms are contradicted by the behavior we 
observe from successful business owners, surely doubt must be cast as much on the normative 
axioms as on the business owners.   8 
 
This case study provides an example of empirical normative economics based on 
ecological rationality, documenting success (defined in context-specific terms) and describing 
the procedures used to achieve that success.  Were we to insist that people in the real world 
follow prescriptions based on the standard model in this task domain (i.e., choosing a location for 
one’s business), this advice would lead to unacceptably large time costs,  missed profit 
opportunities and, because of these disadvantages, almost certain failure in business.
5  This 
evidence speaks affirmatively to the normative value of satisficing heuristics used by business 
owners. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews predictions and prescriptions based on 
the standard optimization model when applied to the task of location choice.  Section 3 describes 
the interview data collected from 2007-2010 and presents findings about the very small 
consideration sets that sophisticated businesses use when choosing location.  Section 4 filters 
these business owners’ data about self-reported performance (i.e., whether they are meeting the 
expected rate of annual return on capital, falling below, or exceeding expectation) using 
compensatory linear-index models and a non-compensatory, information-frugal event tree.  By 
using less information, the non-compensatory model predicts business performance to a much 
                                                           
5 If a business choosing a new location took the standard model at face value, the first step would be to scan the 
budget set consisting of all affordable properties in the entire world.  No matter how remote the location, the 
standard theory sensitizes us to pay attention to potential tradeoffs whereby low enough property prices or 
advantageous amenities could compensate for the remoteness of the location.  In contrast to this compensatory 
model, heuristics can create tremendous value by quickly shrinking choice sets down to manageable size.   See Yee, 
Dahan, Hauser, and Orlin (2007) for a similar argument regarding benefits to consumers of having non-
compensatory rules or requirements that quickly shrink a large field of possibilities down to a manageable handful 
of choices to consider. 9 
 
greater degree of accuracy.  Section 5 interprets these findings in light of local economic 
development policies commonly put forward on the basis of the standard economic model.  
Shortcomings of tax incentives are discussed and alternatives are suggested that could effectively 
achieve business development goals by matching the decision making processes actually used by 
business owners with newly designed institutions.  Section 6 concludes with a brief interpretation 
of these findings. 
 
Section 2: Predictions of the Constrained Optimization Model 
The decision under study in this paper is where to locate one’s business.  This task is well 
suited for studying decision making processes and the real-world application of simple 
heuristics, because the predictions of the standard model based on constrained optimization are 
unusually clear, and relatively easy to distinguish from simple heuristics applied to the same 
location choice problem.  In virtually any principles of microeconomics textbook used in first-
year economics courses, one quickly encounters a graphical representation of the so-called 
canonical choice problem: a consumer choosing two quantities (an x good and a y good) to 
maximize utility subject to a budget constraint.  Students learn the consumer’s choice set, or 
budget set, and identify it with the geometric object of a right triangle intended to represent an 
exhaustive list of the infinite possible combinations of two goods that are affordable at current 
prices.   
The multi-dimensional extension of this in hedonic real estate models views each 
potential location as offering a vector of quantities of different amenities.  For an entrepreneur 
considering locations, each address provides access to a quantity of space, a quality of space, 
access to labor, proximity to sources of other inputs in the production process, and of course 10 
 
customers.  Geometrically, the affordable set in the hedonic location choice model is a multi-
dimensional pyramid.  In the 2-dimensional canonical choice problem, the decision maker sees 
this menu of infinite possibilities instantaneously and with virtually no time or effort costs.  This 
is precisely what the triangle representing the budget set accomplishes: it makes instantaneously 
visible the exhaustive list of all possible actions. 
Given an investment budget, the choice set (budget set, affordable set, or feasible set) 
should include every property that can be afforded at given prices and the available quantity of 
investable funds.  Even for a modest budget, the tenet of exhaustive search in the standard model 
implies that business owners, at least at the initial stage of considering locations, should have 
thousands, if not millions, of potential locations.  Far-away locations, if there are compensating 
features such as large and productive spaces with very cheap rents or access to productive low-
cost workers, cannot be discarded a priori because, by the benefit-cost criterion, there may be 
compensating trade-offs that would make place the optimal location for a business at some 
remote location.   
A more descriptive model of choice could be constructed by drawing a tiny oval 
somewhere inside the budget set representing where the decision maker currently exists and his 
or her very limited view at any point in time of the choice set, whether based on memories of 
places encountered in the past or data bases of locations generated using Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) technology.  The rest of the budget set is, for most decision makers in the real 
world, invisible unless substantial time and cost is expended to add new elements to the list of 
locations that are being considered as possible locations.  The standard consumer model insists 
that the entire budget set is instantaneously observed and that each element is scored in terms of 
net benefits so that the net-benefit maximizing location can be chosen.   11 
 
But consider how large the choice set is even with very modest budgets.  With only 
$100,000 to spend, an exhaustive list of affordable addresses in the world would be vast.  Even 
in Dallas alone, considering the list of affordable addresses would consume so much time that 
prices and economic conditions would be substantially different before the search is complete.  If 
business owners used the textbook model of choice to choose locations, time-consuming 
information collection and site visits would likely bring commerce to a standstill.  Business 
owners engaging in wastefully exhaustive search would miss many profitable investment 
opportunities while occupied with the process of collecting information and making calculations.  
Nevertheless, with GIS technology, Census Data, and computer aided search to manage large 
data bases of potential locations, it is interesting to investigate whether location choice in 
practice looks more like a technologically-aided striving toward achieving the ideal of 
optimization in standard textbooks, or something else altogether. 
 
Section 3: Interview Data 
Data were collected using a convenience sample targeting well placed business owners or 
senior management in charge of location choice and with personal capital at risk in the location 
choice.  All 49 respondents risked substantial personal capital in the investment projects they 
recounted in interviews.
6  Those interviewed included developers of prominent office high-rises, 
                                                           
6 A total of 53 interviews were conducted, which included four other experts on location choice who did not risk 
personal capital in the location choices they described and were therefore excluded from the data analysis presented 
here. The four excluded interviews revealed a number of interesting insights from the vantage point of consultants 
with experience on a large number of location choice decisions. They included two bankers who make business 
loans for a major US bank in Dallas, one location choice consultant with a number of large clients, and a senior 
official in the City of Dallas’ Office of Economic Development.  Excluding these four left a sample of 49. 12 
 
malls, grocery store chains, major chain convenience stores, independent convenience stores, gas 
stations, sporting goods stores, veterinaries, concert halls, bars that feature live music, and 
retailers selling furniture, paints, laundry services, and restaurant owners.  Confidentiality was a 
concern for a number of those interviewed.  Some sensitive numbers about the details of their 
investments were discussed and then grouped into discrete categories, summarized in Table 1.
7   
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for business owners’ location choices.  Projects are 
considered large if total investment capital at the new location exceeded 1 million dollars and 
small otherwise.  Among the 49 projects, 17 (a little over a third) were designated accordingly as 
large.  Participants were asked what kinds of information they considered relevant when making 
location choice decisions.  The number of types of different information mentioned in this open-
ended description is coded as the variable # Types of Information, which ranges from 1 to 5.  For 
example, a neoclassical expected utility maximizer with mean-variance preferences would be 
expected to discuss only return and volatility of returns, which would be coded as # Types of 
Information = 2.  If, in addition, the entrepreneurs mentioned a desire to locate near other 
retailers, or in neighborhoods with particular demographic characteristics (for reasons other than 
their influence on return and risk), then the number of types of information would increase.  This 
variable is dichotomized in the indicator variable Quantity of Information, which flags as hi-info 
those who mentioned 4 or more distinct types of information needed to make good location 
choice decisions, and low-info otherwise. 
                                                           
7 An appendix reproduces the scripted interview questions that structured all interviews.  Responses were open 
ended, but some of the interview items elicited yes/no responses that were coded for statistical analysis, which are 
summarized in Table 1.   13 
 
The variable # Locations in the Consideration Set is one of the most interesting pieces of 
evidence collected in the interviews.  Nine owners described a location choice process in which 
only one location was considered.  The modal response was a consideration choice with three 
potential locations, which describes the choice sets of 20 of the entrepreneurs interviewed.  A 
frequency distribution for this variable is presented and discussed in a subsequent section. The 
next row in Table 1 labeled Consideration Set (Large/Small) dichotomizes the size of the 
consideration set, such that consideration sets with strictly more than three elements are 
designated as large, and small otherwise.  If the standard axiomatic choice model were a good 
description of how location choices are made, we would expect the consideration set to contain 
tens of thousands, if not millions, of potential locations. 
The next three binary variables code entrepreneurs’ self-described decision process 
relating to a specific location choice.  These binary variables indicate whether interviewees ever 
described a process of maximization, a process of satisficing, a process of imitation, or any 
combination of those three.  Deciding precisely how to code self-descriptions of decision process 
is not always clear cut, and a few internally inconsistent sets of responses were recorded to, as 
best as possible, record what entrepreneurs said in these interviews.   
Maximization is particularly thorny, raising subtle distinctions because so many 
behaviors (all?) can be rationalized as if arising from maximization.  Six respondents used the 
word “maximize” while describing what was in fact a process of satisficing.  For example, one 
respondent said: “I try to maximize the return on capital so that it always stays above 10 
percent.”  I interpret this statement to describe a process of adjusting decision variables in a way 
to satisfy the inequality that returns are at least 10 percent (in fact, that is exactly what this 
participant said), which is a satisficing procedure and not maximization.  In its marginalist form,  14 
 
maximization requires choosing decision variables so that the marginal benefit of the last unit 
just equals its marginal cost (before checking second order conditions and checking that local 
extrema are indeed global).  An equivalent set-theoretic description would require exhaustive 
search through a well-defined choice set and choosing the best available option.   
Surprisingly, the language of superlatives (i.e., finding the “best”) was infrequent in 
owners’ descriptions of how they make high stakes investment decisions concerning location 
choice.  Only two participants made descriptions of their decision processes that could be 
described as constrained optimization.  Every single business owner described an inequality or 
threshold condition that was coded as a satisficing process.  In other words, two interviewees 
described both maximization and satisficing, which are internally inconsistent, although the 
coding is true to what was stated in these interviews. 
A strong majority (41 out of 49) described wanting to locate in an area where other 
businesses were already active.  I code this separately as an imitation component or 
consideration in the business owners’ decision process.  Four other characteristics of business 
owners and their investment projects were recorded, which have special relevance to local 
economic development policy.  Dallas’ South Dallas neighborhood is thought of by many 
Dallasites as a low-income, high-crime area that many business owners would never consider as 
a potential location. As one respondent put it, “The city could offer subsidies and incentives until 
my rents are entirely free, and I still would never consider locating my business in South Dallas.”  
This respondent mentioned high crime, the stress that he believed the South Dallas environment 15 
 
would have on his employees, and a general sense of anxiety concerning maintenance of public 
order.
8   
The variable labeled Transformation of South Dallas Possible measures each owner’s 
subjective assessment about whether urban revitalization, gentrification, or sustained 
improvements in economic growth, are possible for South Dallas.
9  Only 11 of 49 respondents 
responded affirmatively.   
The major policy tool that has been discussed in recent decades about simulating growth 
in neighborhoods that seem to have trouble attracting business investment is tax incentives.  The 
interviews revealed great skepticism—among business owners—about this approach.  Only 3 
respondents stated that tax incentives “might” induce them to consider investing in South Dallas.  
As the earlier quotation suggests, most respondents would need something altogether different—
a transformative signal about opportunities in South Dallas—to attract their investment capital.   
Another important policy tool for local economic development is public transportation.  
Dallas has invested substantially in building new light rail lines from the northern suburbs to 
access South Dallas and other neighborhoods that, in recent decades, have not experienced large 
                                                           
8 Whether this is founded in statistical realities is an important issue not addressed in this paper.  There is evidence 
that much of the crime is concentrated within one or two addresses within a neighborhood, which raises questions 
about how fair it is to characterize an entire neighborhood with crime statistics generated by only a few residents.  
Evidence suggests that perceptions and fears are exaggerated relative to actual crime frequencies.  (See the 
discussion and Dallas-specific citations on this point in Berg and Murdoch, 2008). 
9 Some residents and advocacy groups working to attract investment to South Dallas do not aim for gentrification 
and worry openly that, if and when a wave of investment comes to the neighborhood, rents will make the 
neighborhood largely unaffordable for long-time residents.  The point of the interview item was to elicit beliefs 
about how likely it would be, and under what conditions, that substantial levels of commercial investment flow into 
to South Dallas. 16 
 
in-flows of non-residents for daily commercial activity.  Only two respondents said that the 
location of public transportation influenced, or would influence, their location choice decisions. 
Finally, because of local economic development studies that have emphasized the role of 
artists in predicting new business starts, patent applications, and other measures of local 
economic development, all interviews contained discussion items about the arts (Florida, 2002; 
Frey, 2005).  Nine of the respondents owned projects directly connected to Dallas’ arts scene.  
Many others described positive spillovers from the Dallas arts scene to the world of commerce, 
and sentiments among the entrepreneurs were strongly in favor of arts and their role in local 
economic development.    
The final three rows in Table 1 describe an ordered discrete outcome generated by 
participants’ responses to this question: “In the most recent year of operation, would you say the 
rate of return on your investment is below, meeting, or above, the rate of return you expected at 
the time you made the decision to choose the current location?”  I could have analyzed the actual 
rate of return.  But because different projects have different risk levels, the most meaningful 
outcome for this analysis with a heterogeneous sample of different kinds of businesses is to ask 
whether actual return is below, above, or just meeting the expectation that owners had at the time 
the location decision was made.  The interviewed group is, according to their self reports, 
remarkably successful at meeting or exceeding expectations.  Only 16 percent had returns below 
expectations.  47 percent met expectations, and 37 percent exceeded expectations.   
The next section uses linear regression and ordered probit statistical models to predict 
this three-valued dependent variable as a function of a “kitchen sink” model that includes nearly 
all the other variables in Table 1.  These models are used to predict the business returns outcome 
(i.e., below, meets, or above expectations).  And the predictive success of these standard linear-17 
 
index models are compared with the predictive accuracy of a non-compensatory event tree based 
on a theory of heuristics and their match to the business investment environment in Dallas. 
 
Section 4: Statistical Models of Business Performance 
The first step in this section is to estimate a linear regression model and ordered probit 
model and use these fitted models to predict performance outcomes as benchmarks of predictive 
accuracy.  Let yi represent whether the recent year’s returns are below (yi = -1), meet (yi = 0) or 
exceed (yi = 1) expectations at the time the location decision was finalized.  The following linear 
regression model is fit by ordinary least squares: 
yi = a + b1 QuantityOfInformationi + b2 SizeOfInvestmenti + b3 Imitationi + b4 
ConsiderationSeti + b5 Ncompetitorsi + b6 ArtsIndustryi + b7 PublicTransportMattersi + ei, 
where the regressors all correspond to variables described in Table 1, a is a constant, and ei is a 
mean-zero random error assumed to be uncorrelated with regressors.  Fitted values of the linear 
regression model are denoted ystar_REGi.  Based on this, a binary measure of how often 
predicted values hit the actual outcome can be defined as follows: 
hit_REGi = (yi == 1 & ystar_REGi >0.5) | (yi == -1 & ystar_REGi <-0.5) | (yi == 0 &-0.5 < 
ystar_REGi < 0.5), 
where each of the expressions on the right hand side in parentheses (as well as the entire right 
hand side) are logical truth tests that return 1 if true and 0 otherwise.  The variable hit_REGi 
indicates that the fitted value predicts the outcome that was actually observed.  The linear 
regression model generates 28 hits and 21 misses (an accuracy rate of 57 percent).  That is not so 
bad considering there are three outcomes and therefore that random chance has only a 33 percent 
chance of a hit.  18 
 
Economists typically worry about the logical inconsistency of negative predicted 
probabilities using linear regression for discrete dependent variables.  To alleviate those 
concerns, I also fitted an ordered probit model.  The ordered probit model requires two extra 
parameters to cut the fitted linear index into regions where yi = -1, 0 and 1 are predicted.  Given 
these estimated “cut” parameters, each observation gives rise to three fitted probabilities: one 
each for the respective events yi = -1, 0 and 1.  I then define ystar_OPROBITi   as the outcome 
that has the maximum fitted probability. From this, the ordered probit model’s hit indicator can 
be computed: 
hit_OPROBITi = (yi == ystar_OPROBITi). 
Whenever the actual outcome coincides with the predicted outcome, a hit is indicated.  The 
model generates 27 hits and 22 misses, for an accuracy rate of 55 percent, slightly worse than 
OLS despite using two extra parameters. 
Yee, Dahan, Hauser, and Orlin (2007) use non-compensatory trees to predict consumers’ 
decisions when choosing cell phones. They show that it performs better than linear regression. 
Spanning a wide range of literatures from operations research to psychology, the advantages of 
using fewer predictors is well established, pointing to an interesting less-is-more effect in 
prediction relevant to the event tree model presented here that uses only four predictors (Hogarth 
and Karelia, 2005, 2006; Baucells, Carrasco and Hogarth, 2008; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 
2009). Gigerenzer, Todd and The ABC Research Group (1999) show less-is-more effects from 
specific decision heuristics in both real-world and simulated environments, and this is given 
additional theoretical justification in Berg and Hoffrage (2008) who show that ignoring 
information and conditioning on a small number of factors is consistent with payoff 
maximization. 19 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Inspired by this work on non-compensatory decision making, where one factor 
sometimes totally over-rules other factors, a non-compensatory investment return event tree was 
constructed, using a strict subset of the available information.  This model is presented in Figure 
1.  According to Figure 1, a business owner who takes too much time collecting many different 
kinds of information will perform below average (the right terminal branch at the top of the event 
tree in Figure 1).  The tree then bifurcates into small versus large investment projects.  Small 
projects based on some degree of imitation perform above average.  Small projects that do not 
imitate will meet expectations when they have small consideration sets, which likely means 
doing the “obvious thing” (e.g., following local zoning to locate in a central business area). Note 
that imitation can exploit the costly information collection used by other firms and makes it 
easier for customers to find retails (e.g., locating a gas station near other gas stations, or a 
restaurant near other restaurants). For large investment projects, however, imitation does not pay.  
Rather big projects benefit from boldly going somewhere no others had bet on before.  Among 
those that did not imitate, the information-frugal model assumes that less deliberation is better.  
The entrepreneurs whose large-scale development projects are among the most successful real 
estate bets in Dallas said that the locations they chose were discovered by accident (e.g., a 
building first noticed while eating dinner in a new neighborhood with friends, or a promising 
undeveloped area on the entrepreneur’s drive to a golf course on the outskirts of town).   This 
model has no free parameters.  It simply makes predictions based on the four principles: less is 
more when collecting information upon which to base a high stakes decision; large projects 
benefit from originality whereas small projects benefit from a heuristic of imitation, reflecting a 
principle of ecological rationality; choosing from small choice sets is quicker, leads to less 20 
 
regret, and puts the proper focus on a more high-stakes question of what belongs inside the 
choice set in the first place (Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group, 1999; Gigerenzer 
and Selten, 2001; Schwartz, 2004).  The information-frugal model in Figure 1 correctly predicts 
45 out of 49 observations (92 percent accuracy). 
 
Section 5: Location Choice and Implications for Local Economic Development 
  There is an unmistakable normative interpretation built into the assumption that all 
observed behavior derives from optimization.
10 Since all opportunities for individual 
improvements in payoffs have, by assumption, been exhausted in a model with optimizing 
agents, there can be no role for entrepreneurs.  And locations without business activity can only 
be interpreted as lacking business activity because they are unprofitable.  The data in this paper 
suggest alternative explanations and raise the possibility of profitable investments in locations 
that lie unexploited over sustained periods. 
If one encounters a neighborhood or a particular address with little nearby commercial 
activity, the assumption that we live in a profit-maximizing world points to the unavoidable 
                                                           
10  Berg’s (2003) “Normative Behavioral Economics” demonstrates how policy conclusions are tacitly built into 
purportedly descriptive models.  This very methodological complaint was raised before the US Congress recently by 
Nobel Laureate Robert Solow.  He complained that macroeconomic models (the Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium model in particular), which are used to make important macroeconomic predictions, rule out by 
assumption the most important features of the macroeconomy that economists should be working to improve.  
Models with equilibrium in labor markets rule out involuntary unemployment.  And so-called representative agent 
models where the entire economy is modeled as if its decisions are guided by a single decision maker cannot explain 
or reproduce fraudulent behavior in the financial sector that played a role in bringing about the current economic 
crisis. 21 
 
conclusion that the reason for the absence of other investors must be that it is unprofitable to 
locate there.  This would undoubtedly be true if all investors systematically and exhaustively 
considered each element in their entire choice set and independently weighed costs and benefits 
associated with each of these elements.  In such a scenario, the observation that no businesses are 
present at a particular address would indeed imply that thousands of investors had undertaken 
independent benefit-cost analyses and, each time, came to the conclusion that it was unprofitable. 
In this imaginary scenario, the law of large numbers suggests that these many independent 
negative assessments of value amount to virtually irrefutable evidence that the location is a bad 
one and cannot be invested in successfully. 
  The interview evidence in this paper, however, shows that most location choice decisions 
of business owners do not derive from exhaustive search and consideration of all potential 
locations.  The modal size of business owners’ consideration sets is 3, and many owners only 
consider one location.  This already implies the possibility of finding unexploited opportunities 
for profitable investments in a city such as Dallas.   
The second important finding revealed by the interview data is the high degree of 
dependence among business owners’ (especially small business owners’) location choice 
decisions.  Some 84 percent of respondents described using an imitation heuristic—in other 
words, locating where other firms had already chosen to locate.  For smaller investment projects, 
imitation is not foolish behavior.  Rather, it economizes on the research and decision costs of 
others, and exploits the publically observable information in other firms’ location choices.   
There is a large literature on mechanisms that lead to spatial agglomerations.  Imitation 
can be an economical way to find a location where consumers will find the business, usefully 
coordinating economic activity in a city’s urban geography.  However, it also represents a self-22 
 
reinforcing mechanism by which particular areas without many businesses might hold untapped 
investment opportunities for many years with no investors wanting to be the first one to take a 
chance on a location that so many others have overlooked.  The two interpretations contain an 
important distinction: firms overlooking an untapped opportunity (perhaps because of imitation) 
is very different than evidence that many entrepreneurs have considered the location and decided 
against it.  This suggests that bold steps to undertake new investments in locations long regarded 
as unlikely to produce profits could generate tremendous surprises, while providing jobs and 
business opportunities to poor neighborhoods that badly need it.    
Weissbourd (1999) describes enormous untapped profit opportunities in micro lending 
and business development in low income areas.  Firms as sophisticated as Starbucks and Home 
Depot have seen their own revenue forecast models for location choice, which depend heavily on 
neighborhood income, refuted by their profitable experiences in low-income areas (Weissbourd, 
1999; Helling and Sawicki, 2003; Sabety and Carlson, 2003). Cydnie Horwat, Vice President of  
Starbucks Store Development, writes: “Our Urban Coffee Opportunities joint venture has 
essentially shown that Starbucks can penetrate demographically diverse neighborhoods in 
underserved communities, such as our store in Harlem, which is not something that we had 
previously looked at” (Francica, 2000). 
  Why would Starbucks have overlooked profitable opportunities in low-income 
neighborhoods for so long? And why did it require a new joint initiative with nonprofit groups 
working to expand opportunities for low-income residents to discover that the coffee giant could 
operate profitably in low-income neighborhoods?   
  One answer concerns a too-often-forgotten lesson from first-year statistics courses on 
linear regression: predictions that extrapolate outside the range of variation of the data collected 23 
 
produce unreliable forecasts.  For firms that have conditioned their location choices on 
neighborhood income in the past, their entire data base of store revenue and neighborhood 
information is censored to exclude low-income neighborhoods.  It may very well be that among 
middle and upper class neighborhoods, higher income predicts larger store revenues.  
Extrapolating in the opposite direction, in the absence of data, is nothing more than speculation.  
The firm’s revenue forecast models predicted very low revenue in poor neighborhoods despite 
having collected almost no data by experimenting with stores in those neighborhoods.   
Several food and coffee sellers in Dallas have reported that their highest revenue stores 
are in low-income neighborhoods (see references in Berg and Murdoch, 2008). One reason is 
likely to be the lack of competition.  Compared to affluent northern suburbs where one 
commonly finds, for example, two or three grocery stores at a single street intersection, a retailer 
who sets up shop in an area that most others have ignored may enjoy unusually high profits.  
This underscores the question raised earlier: Are neighborhoods that retailers avoid really less 
profitable, or do interdependencies among firms’ location choices lead to inefficient  lock-in at a 
status quo where few stores decide to locate there simply because few stores have decided to 
locate there in the past?  
 
Small Consideration Sets and Tax Incentives for Investors 
Table 2 presents the frequency distribution for the number of elements in the 
interviewees’ consideration sets.  One interviewee could not decide whether he had considered 
three or four locations before deciding, and his response is coded as 3.5. These data suggest that, 
for policy makers wanting to stimulate new investment in poor neighborhoods, one crucial 
component is to find a mechanism that puts the target location into investors’ consideration sets.  24 
 
Given the small sizes of the consideration sets in Table 2, simply making it into the consideration 
set may be the most substantial hurdle.   
[Table 2 about here] 
When policy makers use tax incentives to induce investment in a particular region of a 
city, the best that can be achieved with this policy tool is to tip an investor already considering 
that area in favor of going ahead with an investment.  Tax incentives rest on an optimization 
model where it is assumed that all investors consider the location and simply need a small push 
to make net benefits large enough to trigger investment to the target location.   
Only 3 of the 49 participants in this study said that tax incentives would induce them to 
consider investing in South Dallas.  Some said that, even if they received a subsidy equal to their 
entire costs for a year, they would still not consider locating a store in what they perceived to be 
high-crime neighborhoods.  Others gave specific conditions, usually very visible signals of well-
functioning middle-class commercial districts (e.g., absence of trash, broken cars, loiterers, and 
the appearance of pharmacies, grocery stores and other stores where residents can shop for 
basics). 
The large fraction of respondents that gave accounts of discovering locations by random 
chance suggests that when areas of a city become segregated or economically isolated, with few 
residents from other parts of the city coming into contact with the neighborhood, this by itself 
presents a substantial barrier to the natural flow of investment capital and the random face-to-
face encounters that support it (See Berg, Hoffrage, and Abramczuk, 2010, for more on the 
surprising power of random face-to-face encounters to re-shape a city’s spatial geography).   
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Pairwise correlation between imitation and recent business performance is 0.43 among 
the 32 smaller investment projects, and -0.69 among the 17 larger projects.  This, together with 
the event tree model from Figure 1, suggest that imitation in location choice is a useful heuristic 
that finds a good-enough location (i.e., meeting or exceeding expectations) for a large majority 
of business owners undertaking small projects.   
Large projects, in contrast, appear to suffer from imitation and benefit from bold 
originality, or a contrarian spirit of locating one’s project in an area not previously considered by 
many others.  These results suggest the need for further theoretical and empirical work on several 
related issues. First is the function of economizing on information that imitation affords.  If A 
undertakes costly search and B imitates A, then B benefits from the information that is publicly 
revealed when A chooses his location.  This pooling of the common information resource (i.e., 
the information that A collected and then revealed by its choice of location) through imitation 
will be analyzed in a future theoretical paper.   
A related issue is the social-welfare consequences of imitation.  On the one hand, sharing 
of information would tend to achieve spatial coordination without the waste of each individual 
undertaking completely independent information search.  On the other hand, the potential for 
inefficient lock-in, whereby an untapped profit opportunity lies unexploited over a sustained 
period of time, is clearly a social cost.  A theoretical model that could quantify both of these 
aggregate effects from individuals’ use of imitation would be useful. 
 
Arts and Local Economic Development 
Standard cost-benefit calculus does a poor job of explaining the decision processes 
described by business owners about how they chose their locations.  The role of arts venues 26 
 
seems to play a large role in the thinking of entrepreneurs in a variety of industries (Florida, 
2002).  Interviews with leaders of arts venues, and with leaders of businesses that have no direct 
contact with the arts, reveals a rich portrait of attitudes about the arts among high-level decision 
makers in the Dallas, Texas, business community.  Nearly all of the non-arts-industry 
entrepreneurs spoke about the importance of arts for the cultural life of the city and its spillovers 
to the city’s world of commerce.  This intersection of commerce and culture revealed itself time 
and again when interviewees were asked to envision transformation and describe the desired 
characteristics of local economic growth that they hoped to see.  The ideas in Florida (2002) 
linking arts to economic growth seem to be well corroborated, albeit indirectly, in the various 
personal accounts that nevertheless were nearly consistent on the premise that arts and creative 
people play a special role in cultivating the business environment. 
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
  This paper used scripted interviews of 49 well placed business owners and senior 
managers in charge of deciding where to locate new businesses.  Location choice provides an 
opportunity to compare the predictions of optimization models that require exhaustive search 
with the actual decision processes used in practice when making high-stakes decisions about 
where to locate investment capital.  Consideration sets, especially among the most successful 
businesses, are surprisingly small.  Locations that do make it into consideration are often 
discovered by chance rather than systematic search.  Rather than describing decision processes 
that equate marginal benefit with marginal cost, nearly all interviewees described threshold 
conditions that can be expressed as satisfying an inequality, which provide direct evidence of 
satisficing rather than optimization.   27 
 
Imitation in location choice is beneficial for relatively small investment projects.  The 
smallness of consideration sets and high frequency of imitative reasoning in entrepreneurs’ 
location choices calls into question a key assumption about policies aimed at stimulating local 
economic development.  Neighborhoods that do not attract investment capital are assumed to be 
unprofitable under the standard model.  An alternative explanation based on these data is that 
when firms condition their location choices on the location choices of others, then an inefficient 
lock-in can prevent the discovery of untapped profit opportunities in stigmatized sectors of a 
city.  On the other hand, rather than tax incentives at the margin, a bold push by one non-
imitative investor in a long-ignored area could “seed the cloud” and induce a beneficial cascade 
of new investment and commercial activity based on the same imitative mechanism, which has 
theoretical justification as an information pooling and spatial coordination device.    28 
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 min mean max
description of decision maker's location choice and investment at new location
Size of Investment >$1mil (Large/Small) 0 0.347 1 32 17
# Types of Information 1 2.388 5 . .
Quantity of Information (Large/Small)* 0 0.163 1 41 8
# Locations in the Consideration Set 1 3.010 10 . .
Consideration Set (Large/Small)** 0 0.184 1 40 9
Describe Process of Maximization 0 0.041 1 47 2
Describe Process of Satisficing 0 1.000 1 0 49
Describe Process of Imitation 0 0.837 1 8 41
# Competitors*** 0 3.531 5 . .
Transformation of South Dallas Possible 0 0.224 1 38 11
Tax Incentives Matter 0 0.061 1 46 3
Public Transportation Influenced 0 0.041 1 47 2
Arts Industry 0 0.184 1 40 9
firm's performance in most recent year (ordered dependent variable)
Return Below Expectation 0 0.163 1 41 8
Return Meets Expectation 0 0.469 1 26 23
Return Above Expectation 0 0.367 1 31 18
***The variable # Competitors counts the number of firms or organizations that the 
variables # No (0) # Yes (1)
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Business Owners' Location Choice (N=47)
*Quantity of Information is defined as large if the business owner describes strictly more 
than three types of information used in location choice, and small otherwise.  
**The consideration set is defined as large if strictly more than three potential locations 
were considered, and small otherwise.
***The variable # Competitors counts the number of firms or organizations that the 
participant regarded as a competitor.  If five or more competitors were mentioned, then the 
response was coded as 5.# locations in 










Table 2: Frequency Distribution for the 
Number of Locations in Business 




Figure 1: Information-Frugal Investment Return Event Tree: Business Owners' 
Returns Meet, are Below, or Above Expected Return in the Most Recent Year
This investment return event tree predicts whether businesses' return in the most 
recent year will meet, be below, or above the expected return at the time the location 
choice was made.  This event tree predicts 45 out of 49 observations (92 percent) 
correctly.  In contrast, a fitted ordered probit model using the four variables in this 
model plus three additional variables coded from the interviews  predicts outcomes 
correctly  only 55 percent of the time, and a fitted regression using the same expanded 




no imitate imitate no imitate imitate





aboveAppendix: Script for In-Depth Interview of Business Owners Regarding Location 
Choice 
 
Thanks in advance for agreeing to answer a few questions.  I’m working on a research 
paper about neighborhood dynamics and business investment in the greater Dallas Fort 
Worth metropolitan area.  I’d like to be able to quote your answers, along with those of 
other experts, in my final report.  My use of your answers will be anonymous, of course, 
with no identifying details about you.  My report will eventually be sent to an academic 
journal and possibly used by local policy makers working on economic development.   
 
Q1:  First, would you describe what you do at your job on a typical day? 
 
Q2:  I’d like you to think of a high-stakes decision you recently made as part of your 
job.  Would you describe the decision, the information you needed to consider, and how 
you finally made the decision? 
 
Q3:   One thing I’m particularly interested in is how property investors, retailers and 
other businesses opening new branches (or first-time business ventures) decide on 
locations.  Could you think of one particular case you’ve worked on, or know of, in your 
business, and describe what information was considered by you (and other investors) 
when making the decision of where to locate?  
 
Q4:   Regarding the location decision you just described, please describe the full range 
of possible locations that were considered? I’d like a description of the set of potential 
locations that received consideration. 
 
Q5:   Regarding the location decision you just described above, what reasons were used 
to eliminate possible locations from consideration? 
 
Q6:  What criteria were used to make the final decision? 
 
Q7:   Regarding that same decision described above, could you elaborate more on the 
facts that were considered, and on the basis of what factors, or criteria, were comparisons 
of different locations made?  
 
Q8:  Did DART
1 lines or public transportation enter into the decision process in any 
way? 
 
Q9:  Did you, or do you, consider your business to have competitors?  If so, roughly 
how many competitors does your business have?   
 
Q10:  Did the locations of competitors enter into your location decision? 
 
                                                 
1 DART (Dallas Area Rapid Transit) lines refer to new light rail public transportation in the greater Dallas 
area.  For more information, see http://www.dart.org/. Q11:  When retailers decide where to locate their next branch or new business within 
the Dallas metropolitan area, how important is it what other companies are deciding 
about their locations?  Do the other businesses nearby influence your decision much?  
Examples would be helpful. 
 
Q12:  Would you say that investment decisions in your work are based, in part, on 
observations about other firms’ location decisions?  Or do different firms usually do their 
own, independent analyses of locations?  
 
Q13:  Given the emergence of lively retail and residential property markets in 
previously poor and run-down areas of Dallas, would you expect a transformation like 
that ever to occur in South Dallas
2?  If no, why not?  If so, when, and under what 
conditions? 
 
Q14:  Taking the perspective of a businessperson, what’s the most important thing that 
government could do, or does, to encourage investment in a neighborhood like Fair Park 
in South Dallas? 
 
Q15:  In the most recent year of operation, would you say the rate of return on your 
investment is below, meeting, or above, the rate of return you expected at the time you 
made the decision to choose the current location?” 
 
Thank you very much for taking valuable time to contribute your insights to this project 
under the auspices of University of Texas-Dallas and the Dallas Center for Urban 
Studies. 
  
Q16:  If you have any additional thoughts that you think those of us conducting analyses 
of economic development in Dallas should be aware of, I’d be delighted for you to 
describe them here. 
 
 
Q17:  Also, if there are any individuals who you think I should talk to about these 
issues, I’d appreciate any and all advice 
                                                 
2 Local economic growth in South Dallas has been a concern of City of Dallas policy makers for at least 
several decades.  The area is perhaps unfairly stigmatized.  Many proposals for attracting business growth 
to South Dallas have been proposed and are the subject of ongoing debate. 